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7ilK SITUATION T'ipAY 
A brief review of the situation re fra r iing tao ase ;r p:> -.•?;;.. 
computers as it stands today will be presented. It can servo as a 
reference framework against which some ideas abcu- fu*urv .i-.-vo'lop-
iiit-jits to be given later can be viewed, compared an.: evaluate i. 
The applications which, are of direct interest here lie in the 
areas of conventional and nuclear power generation, although rue 
should not omit completely mention of the use of computer's for 
the monitoring and control of power distribution (!,."'). 
The inclusion of a digital computer in conventional power' 
plants dates back to the time of LITTLE dVPaY I and Ftiwanda ^ 
and 4 (1961-3) in the US after power plant automation studies 
carried out by the respective companies indicated that the use 
of a digital computer would be advantageous for the automatic 
supervision of the plant. These first attempts were not complete 
successes but, in the following years, technological developments 
in the computer field coupled with a more careful choice of ap-
plication have led to a steadily increasing acceptance of the use 
of digital computers. For example, statistics from a recent Amer-
ican survey (3) indicate that of 42 conventional power stations 
79% had automatic data collection 
69$ had performance computers 
J>1% had some form for computer control. 
In time, the economic factor will completely justify the 
wider use of computers; at the moment, questions regarding reli-
ability remain. 
The review will be restricted to the situation in the UK and 
Canada since the utilization of computers in power plants has to 
some extent been the most advanced in these two countries. Mow-
ever, reference should also be made to work being carried out in 
Germany and Norway (4,5). 
The UK 
Jervis, in an informative survey article (f-), •'•"/pi-"1 '•n:; t-nf' 
English (CFfJR) point of view regarding the us<-- of computer;; in 
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reel! conventional and nuclear plants. The trend toward central-
;-• I »iu:iitoring and control has made the use of computers at-
*"3<-tive for the display and recording of data and alarms, es-
pe^-i^ly if a savings in operating staff can be achieved at the 
same time. With regard to conventional plants, an economic case 
foi- computer control has not been established, however, since 
thtr average replacement cost of generating capacity for these 
stations coupled with their fairly short (hot) start-up times 
give- cost penalties over the life of the station which are low 
compared to the cost of a comprehensive computer control system. 
Therefore, most English thermal stations are capable of operating 
indefinitely without the computer with the only restriction im-
ptj;;p:i by its unavailability being the loss of some start-up func-
tions and detailed monitoring and logging. 
-n the other hand, nuclear power stations give a considerably 
hi>-'n=r cost penalty for outages and therefore a suitably reli-
able (= redundant) computer control system (without extensive 
back-up) which keeps outage rates down can be economically justi-
fied. 
Table 1 from Jervis' article summarizes the tasks assigned 
to the computers in the various stations. 
The following comments regarding these tasks may be rele-
vant: 
a) CEGB does not consider the use of the computer in a non-
redundant configuration as acceptable for auxiliary sys-
tem sequence control. Since conventional plant is pro-
vided normally with single computer systems, wired pro-
gram sequ»r.Cs? control equipment is used. 
b) Turbogenerator startup and loading via the computer is 
quite common. 
c) CEGB prefers DDC for economical reasons in the new nu-
clear stations and is planning extensive use of this in 
Hartlepool, for example. 
d) CEGB does not perform off-line calculations or other 
tasks on an on-line computer; in fact, they consider any 
on-line modification and development of programs to be 
extremely hazardous and therefore do not provide any 
facilities for doing this. 
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nukes the point that the price I'J? alarr. anai\a-l^ soft-
ware Js very high and that CEGB plan;:, to r-.> i uco It? com-
plexity in future stations. It i.; perhapr, s i/aii ric:-.>H t: 
note that the Isle of Grain plants the newest- ?? the con-
ventional stations, will not have alarm analysis. 
Table 2 gives further details on the computer sys ter., en-
ployed and includes references to an appropriate configuration 
sketch on Fig. 1. 
It is seen that conventional plants have computer configur-
ations which either consist of a single computer systen shared 
among all plant units or a separate computer system per plant 
unit. More computer control functions are acceptable in plants 
with the latter organization and in one of these newer stations 
(Isle of Grain), CEGB is actually using mini-computers with an 
expanded working store and backing disc. In addition, an extra 
computer for common services is included. In other plants, a 
computer type with a separate "arithmetic and logic processor" 
and up to 14 separate "input/output processors" which all sharr' 
main store is employed. 
CEGB has apparently not yet been able to standardize on a 
configuration for their conventional stations. The computer/ 
plant item permits development, testing and commissioning to 
occur individually as required while a common computer can offe1" 
nome economy due to resource sharing. 
In all but the earliest MAGNOX nuclear plants, some form for 
redundancy is provided. Since all of these stations consist of 
reactor/turbine/generator pairs, the standby capacity is shared 
between the two units. Pig. 1 b-d illustrate the various forms 
for redundacy which are used. These are all "external" : ; the 
sense that complete cpu-store-local peripheral sub-systems are 
replaced when a computer switch-over takes place. These systems 
have well-defined change-over points which can be suitably de-
signed for high reliability. A typical example is shown in Kig.?. 
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CKUB ha:-- established criteria for the reliability of the 
com: Mter-power station combination. Fault behavior is classified 
into the following four states: (quoted from Jervis) 
"State 0: The system is completely operational and without 
any module faults. All standby equipment is operational in 
this state. 
State 1: The system is operational so that it does not place 
any restrictions on the control of the reactor-turbine unit. 
State 1 is normally required for the startup of the reactor 
or turbine. It should be noted that, for state 1, some 
modules may have failed, i.e. the standby may be in use. 
State 2:Faults have occurred so that the control of the 
reactor turbine unit is severely restricted. Such restric-
tions on control probably amount to operation at steady 
load. The actual facilities required to be operational in 
state 2 have a major effect on the configuration of the 
computer system. 
State 3• More faults have occurred so that the computer 
system cannot be used for operating the plant. If conven-
tional backup control and instrumentation were not pro-
vided, the reactor-turbine unit would have to be shut 
down. 
The following is an example of some considerations relating 
to the various states that apply to a CEGB mark II reactor 
system having full d.d.c. with sufficient backup equipment 
to operate in state 3 at steady load for at least 10 min. 
State 0: The design target is a system with an availability 
of at least 99.5/5 over a system life of 30 years, i.e. total 
downtime of less than 111 h per year. 
State 1: The design target for this state is an availability 
of 99.9?. For a nuclear station being started up 100 times 
in its station life, the probability of computer failure 
preventing a startup should be 0.1. 
State 2: No single fault on a reactor-unit computer system 
should cause a change from state 0 to state 2. For the con-
figuration of Fig.2 the minimum facilities for the mainten-
-St-
ance of state 2 are indicated in Table 3. These correspond 
to the loss of a single equipment block defined in Fig. 2. 
State 3: The probability of a reactor-unit computer system 
failing to state 3 should be lower than 0.5 for once in 7 
years. The corresponding figure for the 2-reactor computer 
system should be once in 30 years. The degradation from 
state 0 to state 3 will be due to the combination of sev-
eral failures. The maximum reinstatement time of the sys-
tem from state 3 to state 0 should be less than 1 h." 
The following guidelines were used in arriving at the con-
tents of each "block" shown in Table 3 and Fig. 2. 
(a) Where an item of equipment is time-shared, and the loss 
of all facilities would result from its failure, a 
standby is provided with automatic changeover. Examples 
are the central processor units, the auxiliary stores 
and the main-pcwer-supply motor-generator sets. 
(b) Where it is uneconomical to provide 100K redundancy, 
diversity is employed to restrict the consequences of 
the failure, e.g. by splitting the inputs into relative-
ly small blocks of, say, 500 analogue inputs per scanner. 
(c) Where the failure of a peripheral can block the highway, 
automatic isolation arrangements are provided to discon-
nect the faulty unit. 
(d) Adequate peak loading capacity is provided so that an 
acceptable, but reduced, service is available at non-
peak times although one part may be out of action. An 
example of this is the e.r.t. system, which is divided 
into two parts, either of which is normally adequate 
for running the reactor for a few hours. 
(e) Where certain information is vital, it is fed through 
two channels, so that a single failure does not cause 
its loss, though it may reduce the scanning speed. 
(f) The electronic components used have a generous rating 
in terms of the temperature environment in which the 
equipment operates. The printers are normally allocated 
to specific duties, and are lightly loaded to extend 
their life. 
Items (b), (.1) and (el nre exarple.n c>:' cracoful iofT'iint ion. 
(g) Facilities are provide! to test the peripherals on a 
c.p.u. In nuclear stations, this is usunlly done offline, 
so as not to interfere with normal operation, and special 
diagnostic software is provided. 
Table 3 
example of the al location of f ac i l i t i e s and 
the fraction lost by equipment-block failure 
block Component of block Overlap or duplication 
Fraction of 
faci l i ty lost 
by failure of 
equipment 
block 
C.R.T. 
Disc Duplicated 
1/3 
0 
2 
3 
4 
Analogue inputs 
Digital inputs 
1/3 digital outputs 
1 printer 
1 punch 
Analogue inputs 
C.R.T. 
Digital inputs 
1/3 digital outputs 
2 printers 
C.R.T. 
Disc 
Digital inputs 
1/3 digital outputs 
1 printer 
1 tape reader 
90H overlap 
Duplicated 
90X overlap 
Duplicated 
Duplicated 
Dupli .ated 
1/10 
0 
1/3 
1/1 
1 
1/10 
1/3 
0 
1/3 
1/2 
1/3 
0 
0 
1/3 
1/1 
1 
Mote that the blocks are shown in Fig. 2. 
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In the newest nuclear stations (Hartlepool arU Heysham) (8, 
9 ) a the input scanning equipment for both contact and analog in-
puts is located in remote areas to save on cable costs. Five sep-
arate groups of 512 analog and up to 506 contact inputs are used, 
each in areas where the signals to be monitored are generated. 
This division gives a further saving on high premium floor area 
in the region of the central control room with a reduction in 
ventilation requirements. 
Jervis, in another paper (7), gives some reported availabil-
ity figures for European nuclear power plants. His data are re-
produced in Table 4 and, although subject to the usual difficul-
ties in interpretation of such information coming from different 
sources, they indicate that present-day redundant computer-based 
instrumentation systems have an availability of 99-8% or better 
over a 1/2 to 1 year operating interval. 
Table »I 
Some repor ted a v a i l a b i l i t y f igures for nuclear power p l an t s 
S t a t i o n 
A 
D 
C 
D 
E 
F 
. System 
1 cpu serving 2 r a a c t o r s 
1. cpu & standby serv ing 
2"reac tors 
1 cpu serving one r eac to r 
with shared standby 
1 cpu serving one 
" 
» 
r e a c t o r 
Year & 
period 
1970/71 
1 year 
1970/71 
1 year 
1971 
6 months 
1971 
9 months 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1971 
A v a i l a b i l i t y 
95.3 
99.88 
99.91 
98.5* 
95 
95.9 
98.7 
99.75 
Remarks 
Special r,ite t e s t 
with l imited programs 
Continuous maintenance 
at tendance 
Computer used for 
on- l ine and o f f - l i n e 
operat ion 
Experimental plant 
0 " 1971 98-91 
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Canada _ 
Canadian applications of computers in their nuclear stations 
can also be of interest (10^11), Their reactors are all heavy wa-
ter moderated with natural uranium and either light or heavy 
water cooling. The newer reactors are large enough in physical 
size to require multi-dimensional control features. 
Douglas Point was the first station with some form for com-
puter control. It employs a single machine which is used, among 
other things, for set-point control on fast power regulation and 
DDC to counter any flux tilt in the core. However, the reactor 
can operate without the computer. The Douglas Point installation 
is somewhat unique in that there exists a physical connection 
between the computer and the independent safety system. "AND" 
circuits in the safety system receive one input from the com-
puter. These signals monitor the outlet temperature in each group 
of fuel channels. The other input (flow) is processed independ-
ently. If flow is lov; and temperature is high in the same group 
of channels, the reactor will be tripped. The computer also 
monitors some of the safety sensors to permit better testing 
for rationality. 
Trree later stations, Pickering, Gentilly and Kanupp, all 
use double computer systems (see Table 5) which perform DDC or 
set-point control in various critical loops. Cost factors miti-
gated against a three computer arrangement and reliability fac-
tors ruled out the use of a single computer. Analog or manual 
backup was not considered to be feasible. 
In Pickering, xenon-induced instability has lead to dynamic 
control of reactivity by the computer in zones where the light 
water level can be controlled in each of 14 zones - either in-
dependently or in unison. In addition, the computer system con-
trols boiler pressure, computes plant power set-point, controls 
the fuelling machine and monitors several hundred plant variables. 
Vital control tasks are executed by each computer using the 
same set of triplicated input signals but only one machine is 
connected to the actual controller if a "standby" mode is em-
ployed. If a failure occurs in the controlling computer, a 
changeover unit switches the controller to the other computer. 
Tf the second computer fails, control reverts to one of several 
If 
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fail-safe conditions, in addition, each computer monitors sets 
of critical parameters (such as channel outlet temperature) and, 
if both agree that a temperature is too high, a special action 
such as controlled power set-back will take place. Other less 
/itL'J tasks such as control of the fuelling machine or process 
::io::ir,:v: tig at-;? iivl Lt between the two computers. 
In Gent illy {12), the computer system performs DDC of booster 
rod.; for coarse reactivity control, of absorber rods for power 
.-•- turoi. and spaciaL conuroi (via stepping motors) and of coolant 
.""U,,: as ci function of power. Input signals for essential func-
i;io;;s are conaecbeci r,j o.'.th computers. However, the control pro-
gram will normally run only in one machine. A detected failure 
in the active machine will result in a signal to the other to 
take over control. If both machines fail, the reactor will be 
shut down. 
A CRT display is included for the presentation of messages, 
trend curves and power distribution plots. 
Kanupp in Pakistan uses DDC extensively for control of power 
and reactivity. Here, a "parallel" form for control is used. The 
instrumentation system is dual from sensors to controllers. Mod-
erator level control is exercised by both computers with each 
controlling one of the two valves. In practice, one computer has 
its set-point value for the main process variable (in this case, 
steam pressure) set slightly higher than that of the other so 
that its valve will normally be completely closed (no flow). If 
the other (controlling) computer fails, its valve position will 
he frozen and, if the pressure rises, the other computer will 
take over. In practice, the operator will switch to manual and 
adjust the frozen valve to bring the new controlling valve to a 
more optimum position. 
On the basis of their pioneering work with computers in con-
nection with the NRU experiment in 1963 and their experience from 
Douglas Point, the Canadians believe that they can demonstrate 
that self-checking techniques can be relied upon to announce 
virtually any computer malfunction. Pearson remarks that "these 
diagnostic procedures have reached a high level of sophistication 
in our recent control system designs ". Prom the available 
literature (13), these procedures and techniques are known to 
include the fol lowing: 
- 15 -
- protection against bad drum-to-core transfers. 
- core memory parity check. All detected errors lead auto-
matically uo a reload of the system from drum. 
- execution time of all computer control and alarm functions 
are checked. If excessive, the function is recalled and 
tried again. If still excessive, the function is dropped 
and its outputs set to a safe value. 
- all active functions are checked for actual execution. 
- a periodic circulating data check which first outputs a 
reference value from a table in memory. This signal is 
passed through a P/A converter the output of which forms 
one of the regular signals to the analog input system. 
The resulting conversion back to digital form is com-
pared with the original value. The test signal can be 
made to vary over the expected range of input. On Douglas 
Point, the analog value is fed to a strip chart for moni-
toring purposes. The program can be designed to check the 
executive program, the hardware timers, the interrupt 
system, memory, the instruction repertoire and the analog 
output and input systems. 
- a hardware "watchdog" timer. 
In addition, Smith and Morris (14) mention that all input 
data are checked for rationality and that other checks are made 
which protect against the execution of commands in a sequence 
other than the intended one. 
They discuss also the background for the choice of a double 
computer configuration. As they state, redundancy does not help 
in the case of design faults, but, aside from this, they were 
interested in the practical overall reliability which could be 
achieved with a digital computer control system in a real in-
dustrial environment. In the case of Pickering which is a 4 x 500 
MW station, they considered the idea of one computer per block 
with extra capacity in each to permit the taking over of two 
blocks in the event of a failure but concluded that this would 
not lead to a real economic advantage since most of the cost is 
in the process interface equipment. Instead, they chose to use 
a redundant configuration in each block. Both computers perform 
the critical functions while dividing the other tasks between 
them. The method of backup on duplicated tasks was also studied 
16 -
'.;::.: i-.- . Tj:iult that both "parallel" and "standby" modes are 
'in:-, i :m was mentioned previously. In the parallel mode, the con-
tr_lli.hg devices, the feedback transducers and the computers are 
-.iupl i^ i'ttid and control is shared continuously. 
; ii the standby mode, both computers attempt to execute the 
.jonti'o: i'uriction simultaneously (in order to eliminate the up-
[•>•': r ••'' \he oackup computer at takeover time) but only the 
n
:\o.-;..\j.:,i computer exercises control. To reduce differences in 
tranaducersj both computers have access to all input data and 
averhgv them before use. A/D differences can be reduced by peri-
odic re-eaiibration using- the check loop discussed previously. 
Pearson in 1972 (15) stated that the Gentilly system was on 
the way to becoming a fully operational unit with the double 
computer system functioning as planned. Computer switchover rate 
was down to once/week. The flexibility of the computer approach 
has made it possible to implement changes in control algorithms 
and interlock procedures as more experience was gained. In addi-
tion, transient and frequency response testing of the reactor 
has been passible with the computer both applying the disturb-
ances and recording the results. A third computer (without pro-
cess interfaces) has been acquired for training and programming. 
In audition, an on-line process simulator has been extremely 
valuable for initial program and hardware troubleshooting. 
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SECTION II 
fmportant Trends and Technical Developments in Control Computing (1) 
.'evt'i'al current areas of development in computing and in-
;;t:-n;r:ont technology will have an impact on control computing 
:•/-?' *;:ie next five years. It is doubtful whether such develop-
ments .-.'ill he- uniformly applied. A more likely course of events 
L3 tnat bi)E« of the developments will be applied to some systems. 
Cor-i^ ut-jE.1 Trice and Performance (2)(3) 
-The most significant development in computer technology over 
the next five years will be the gradual increase in use of large 
^eale integrated circuits. The effects on performance can be large 
since :;.jre computing power can become available at the same price. 
A general improvement in reliability should also result from the 
reduction in power levels and number of interconnections. Reduc-
tion in prices will be less easy to obtain. Already for the larger 
computers, selling, support, and service accounts for a large 
part of the manufacturers expenditure. For a particular installa-
tion, this is not reduced significantly by using more advanced 
hardware. Hence price reduction for computers will be most notice-
able in the minicomputer area, where there is less 'free* support 
for installation, software, servicing, etc., and where costs for 
such support can be spread over a larger number of sales. 
Concentrating on the cheapest of the computers which can 
reasonably be programmed for general purpose use, this indicates 
a minicomputer with just ^ K words of store and a teletype. The 
basic cost of such equipment has fallen from about $ 15.000 in 
1967 to about $ 3,000 in 1972. Over the same period, the price 
of *f K 16 bit words of storage has fallen from about $ 8,000 in 
1967 to about $ 2,000 in 1972. (The change is even greater if 
money values are reduced to I967 levels). 
In principle, the cost of a minicomputer processor could 
fall to very low levels comparable with the cost of say 10-20 
LSI chips, $ 1-200. Such a development would rely on a very large 
market, and a significant reduction in support and service costs. 
This sort of pattern can be seen in the development of LSI pro-
cessors for desk calculators, costing in 1972 about $ 50 for 3—i| 
- 19 -
chips. Such a development would not result in the sort of proces-
sor which supports many peripherals, and has a reasonable degree 
of software support for control. A more likely development rele-
vant to the control market, is that more advanced and powerful 
computers will become available at about $ 4,000-6,000. Such com-
puters will have more powerful instruction sets, better address-
ing structures, and better interfacing and interrupt equipment, 
without a significant increase in price. 
At the 3ame time as minicomputers develop, the speeds of 
memory will increase (to around 100 ns, at which point signal 
transmission speed begin to become significant) and the cost of 
memory will fall significantly. An order of magnitude reduction 
in cost to about $ 100 for 4 K words of store, is much easier to 
anticipate, since such stores could be used on a very wide range 
of computers, and thus reach a large market. At the same time, 
the normal store package for a minicomputer will increase in size 
It will be more normal to fit 16 K or 32 K words of store to a 
minicomputer. Similar increases in the * normal* amount of fast 
store will also be seen on the larger computers. 
The significance of these developments for control computing 
are fourfold: 
(1) It will be less necessary to 'optimize' program speed 
and size, by using assembly language for programming. 
(2) Many applications which might at present be uneconomic, 
because of program size, will be limited instead by 
development and programming costs. 
(3) If for security reasons, or to simplify development, 
it is desirable to split programs among two or more 
computers, then neither technological limitations nor 
hardware coats are likely to prevent such a split. 
About four years ago, the first logical controller (4) ap-
peared for use as a replacement for relay systems in repetitive/ 
sequential control applications. These offered a flexibility ad-
vantage in that their programs could be altered to suit the ac-
tual situation. In addition, it was relatively easy to interface 
them to higher-level computers for monitoring and diagnosis. They 
cost between $ 5j000-12,000 and incorporated a central processor 
employing combinations of discreet and integrated components 
which executed a program stored in a read-only memory to perform 
the required counting, sequencing, timing and logic functions. 
They also included interfaces designed to handle directly such 
items as contactors, solenoids, etc. and, in general, were cap-
able of operating in an industrial environment. Execution speeds 
were relatively low compared to general-purpose minicomputers 
but, in the following years, many different models of these in-
dustrial controllers appeared on the market. 
An important and related development within the past year 
or so has been the emergence of low cost "micro" computers (5), 
manufactured with MOS/LSI techniques which can offer significant 
savings insofar as central processor costs are concerned, f-mong 
other things, these offer instruction sets which are more ex-
tensive than the models mentioned earlier and again are poten-
tially useful in dedicated applications. In power plants they 
could be used, for example, in the more standardized tasks such 
as motor, pump and burner control where the ultimate in speed 
is not required. 
A typical micro-processor* today consists of three MO pin 
chips and costs about $ 300. Others are already priced as low as 
$ 50 in quantity. However memory and peripheral costs are far 
from insignificant and, in addition, programming is more awkward 
than on the larger machines. Since semiconductor firms rather 
than computer manufacturers are producing these units, proper 
support facilities are not as extensive. However, these units 
are a potentially inexpensive and flexible tool for implementing 
all sorts of dedicated control system functions. See (19) for 
one of the first applications - "A digital brain for a digital 
valve". 
^Another recent related development is the appearance of the 
C-Mos (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) circuit as a 
competitor [or supplement) to the other commonly employed types 
of logic. C-MOS offers the advantage of low power consumption, 
high conducted noise immunity and operation from a single power 
supply. Predictions are that thi;> technique will win wide ac-
ceptance in the future in applications where ultra-high speed 
is *iot required. 
backing Store 
Disc (drum) memory is unlikely to decrease very much in 
cost per unit although recording densities will rise. This will 
not have a significant effect on control computing. Of greater 
importance from the standpoint of reliability are the current 
programs in the US and Japan which aim at the development of 
non-mechanical substitutes for dine and drums at comparable (and 
even ultimately lower) prices (6). These replace the mechanical 
motion of a moving media with the intrinsically faster movement 
of magnetic domains in a stationary media and use r.hift register 
techniques to access the contents. The most promising approach 
(so-called magnetic "bubble" memory) permits a high packing den-
sity (approx. 1.5 x 1Q-1 bits/cm have been achieved) and compar-
able shift rates (3 megabits/sec have been reached). Access time 
is proportional to shift register length. In addition, these 
units can be made so that their contents are insensitive to power 
failures. 
Actually the first commercial version of magnetic domain 
memory appeared 3-4 years ago. Its bit price is about 0.25 cents 
- the ultimate goal is 0.001-3 cents, or about 1/lOth the cost 
of a disc. 
One should also mention the current availability of so-
called "silicon disc" memories (7) which are rather expensive 
(1-2 cents/bit) equivalents using MOS shift registers connected 
so as to simulate the mechanical rotation of a disc or drum. An 
advantage is their high word transfer rate and low access time. 
Another advantage which they share with the magnetic domain ap-
proach is that alternate structures are possible which can op-
timize performance for a specific application. At any rate, it 
is quite possible that the intensive work being done to reduce 
random-access semiconductor memory costs will also affect the 
"silicon disc" approach and make it attractive in special situ-
ations. 
For the sake of completeness, mention should be made of the 
intensive development work being carried out on electrooptical 
techniques. However the current consensus of opinion is that their 
entry into the market lies beyond the time scale of this report. 
In addition, their preferred areas of application are still some-
what unclear at this moment. 
To sum up, the impact of such developments in mass memories 
for control computing is that random access backing store in the 
moat useful size, should become cheaper and more reliable. It 
will still be necessary to make special provision for storage 
failure, either by duplication of stored data and programs, or by 
providing rapid reinitialization procedures. But the cost of 
backing store duplication should be lower, and the effectiveness 
increased. 
The increased speed of such memories will be significant in 
improving performance for systems which move programs between 
backing store and main store, or which store large tables of 
variables. The closer match between main store and backing store 
speeds will make the use of paging organization more attractive, 
leading to considerable simplification in the design of systems 
using large data tables, or large programs. 
Communication and Bus Systems 
One of the most significant changes in minicomputer archi-
tecture over the past three years, has been a change to bus 
structures for accessing both main storage and peripheral inter-
face registers (8)-(ll). 
The effect of these changes has been to enhance system 
flexibility and expandability and to make equipment interfacing, 
and especially, direct memory access, both easier and cheaper. 
However increases in store and processor speeds have made the 
signalling time along a bus more significant. Therefore we can 
expect to see an increase in the number of busses per central 
processor, and the number of ports per memory module. This will 
allow easier overlap in fetching instructions, and reduce the 
direct memory access interference with program execution (im-
portant for discs, and if processor store is used for refreshing 
displays). It will also enable multiprocessor architectures to 
be implemented more easily. 
Bus systems have also been developed for interfacing instru-
ments and peripherals, independent of the memory or peripheral 
access channels. 
The Camac system (12) is a parallel data bus system, which 
has been standardized. Implementat inns of the bus controller 
have been developed for several computers. The Camac bus serves 
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as a multiplexer for a potentially large number of instruments. 
The instrument interfaces need only be developed once, new in-
terfaces are not needed for each new computer type. When a new 
computer is developed, all that is necessary is to develop a new 
bus controller. 
The main advantage of such a system is that interfaces can 
be standardized, and this has resulted in a wide range of choice 
of instruments for nuclear measurements, on many computer sys-
tems. This particular system has a higher data capacity than is 
required for many process instrumentation applications (2k bit 
lines with a register reading rate between 1 and 100 ysec). Also 
the flexibility in choice of computer or of instruments is not 
so likely to commend itself to manufacturers used to supplying 
ing complete control systems of their own design. However, it 
could prove very useful to a potential user with several process 
control applications. 
An alternative form of instrument interconnection has be-
come commercially available, for use either with or without a 
computer (13). Its objective is to reduce the costs of cabling, 
and to reduce the noise sensitivity of instrument connections. 
The principle is to use just one high frequency cable configuration 
for transmission over long distances, and to use multiplexers to 
provide individual lines to instruments, etc. relatively close to 
their actual location. 
Many alternative configurations are available over a wide 
range of data transmission capacity. The highest capacity systems 
use coaxial cable for serial synchronous signalling, at about 2 m-
band to reach the multiplexers. The multiplexer connects to ana-
logue to digital and digital to analogue converters, or to digi-
tal input and output stations, via twisted pair lines. 
The highest capacity systems can sample 5,000 analogue in-
puts or about 60,000 discrete inputs, per second. 
A novel system designed by Hitachi (14),(15) provides pair 
of coaxial cables, in a loop up to 1 km long. Up to 100 multi-
plexers can be situated on the loop, with a maximum of 5 analogue 
and five discrete inputs or outputs per multiplexer. By using 
several such small multiplexers, the distance between instru-
ments and the main data channel is further reduced. Communication 
is invulnerable to a single break in the data channel. 
Coupling from each multiplexer station to the data highway 
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is accomplished via special transformers which provides isolation, 
common-mode rejection and fail-safe operation in the event of a 
station failure. 
For power plant use, the reliability of a single cable com-
munication system would need to be carefully considered. However, 
it should be possible to increase communication reliability above 
present levels by duplicating communication lines (and possibly 
multiplexing equipment) without leading to excessive cost. 
A very important feature of these systems is that they can 
be designed to stand alone and operate without the computer. 
The impact of developments in communication of data on con-
trol computing will be very significant. One of the major factors 
which affects reliability for computer control systems at the 
moment, is unreliability and noise sensitivity in the interfac-
ing equipment and in interconnections. By reducing crowding, and 
reducing the length of analogue signal transmission, these prob-
lems should be reduced. Additionally, where such communication 
systems are introduced in order to save cabling costs irrespec-
tive of computer control requirements, one of the major obstacles 
to use of computers will be removed. 
Process I/O 
This portion of a computer control system is one of the 
most expensive and most difficult to design. The large number 
and types of channels involved and their various locations with-
in the plant proper require careful attention to cabling, shield-
ing, back-up, etc, to maximize data security and reliability. 
Conventional techniques today employ some form for multi-
plexing of analogue and digital signals. The cost/channel for 
the former using reed relays, filters, and "flying capacitor*1 
isolation to solve noise and common-mode problems are high. 
Newer systems which employ PET switches with zener-diode and 
fuse protection usually employ several levels of multiplexing 
to reduce the effects of capacitance and leakage and thus obtain 
high scanning spreads. They are also expensive. 
More widespread use of electro-optical devices is likely 
in this area, basically as isolating units to remove common-mode 
and grounding problems and improve plant security in the case of 
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physical accidents. Ultimately, 5t may become feasible to use 
linear light-diode coupling for analog transmission. 
However, changes in the cost of digital electronics are 
likely to affect the way that instrument and actuator interfac-
ing is carried out. 
Firstly, analogue to digital converters, amplifiers, and 
shift registers are becoming much cheaper. If digital conversion 
equipment were included in each analogue instrument, the cost 
could be as little as $ 100 per instrument, comparing favourably 
with present day multiplexed analogue to digital converters. The 
advantage would be simpler wiring, and by using redundant data 
transmission codes, less noise sensitivity. 
Finally, it is now economical to implement two and three-
term controllers using digital electronics. The advantages lie 
in their simpler coupling to computing equipment. Actually, if 
these units were part of a digital communication system with 
corresponding digital instrument transmitters, it would be pos-
sible to produce a digital control system capable of working 
without a computer. 
Seen from another angle, if one extends the idea of distrib-
uted processing using the "micro" computers mentioned earlier, 
the concept of centralized control begins to disappear and the 
distinctions between interfaces and computers become also less 
clear. For example, process data are then available for remote 
manipulating at their points of origin via arrays of communicat-
ing dedicated machines using standard programs. This results al-
so in lower traffic demands for information and coordination. 
ICI's MEDIA system (16) illustrates the start towards such 
an approach. This is now being produced commercially. 
Although all of these developments are possible, it is un-
likely that they will be introduced simultaneously in any appli-
cations. The coordination of development would be difficult, 
and the risks involved in making many developments at one time 
are large. 
Pisplay/Controls Interface 
The trend toward centralized and integrr±ted control room 
configuration will continue with the computer playinp; a vital 
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role in the management of the display/controls interface. Many 
major process instrumentation firms such as Siemens, Brown-Bove-
ri, Poxboro and General Electric (see, for example, their NUCLENET 
1000 system) are active in this field. Developments in raising 
the level of automation employed in future plants will have a 
strong and direct influence on the functions, layout and commun-
ication facilities which will be incorporated. 
The CRT will continue as the ma.ior device for display al-
though expectations are that the plasma display may emerge as a 
serious competitor in view of its potential for large-screen 
colour presentations without the need for external refreshing 
if the price can be made comparable to that of an equivalent TV 
tube-based system. Units have already been built as large as 
40 x 40 cm with a total of 512 x 512 three-colour display ele-
ments (17). 
Light emitting diodes (LED*s) (18) can also become useful 
for displaying small amounts of alpha-numeric information - or 
ultimately as status displays - now that colour limitations are 
disappearing. Liquid-crystal displays, the other major contender 
at the moment, do not seem likely to have a major impact in the 
control room. 
Present use of light pens, tracker balls, etc. for direct 
operator interaction with the information displayed on the screen 
will give way to systems which permit simple finger pointing 
without the need for special devices. However, wide-spread use 
of direct voice command recognition is leas likely. 
A special problem which is named quite frequently in dis-
cussions on "paper-less1- control rooms is that of obtaining 
"hard-copies" of relevent process data when desired. These could 
then form part of the archive on station performance which could 
become a valuable aid during many phases of subsequent plant op-
eration. 
The solution to the "hard-copy" problem has not really been 
solved economically as yet although several devices are now 
available on the market with prices from about $ 5000 and up. 
There are many relevant factors to consider such as initial and 
running costs, time required to make a copy, copy size and per-
manence, need for a special CRT, etc. The least expensive sol-
ution today is probably still the polaroid camera - while a tech-
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nical break-through is said to be necessary before a reasonable 
cost/performance ratio can be achieved. 
In summary, the overall implication of the developments 
mentioned earlier is that costs should not raise substantial 
obstacles in the way of providing sufficiently flexible and re-
dundant control room facilities. 
References - Section II 
(1) Electronics 13/9-71. Survey article s. 61. 
(2) LSI - Implications for Future Design and Architecture -
S.F. Dennis and H.G. Smith. SJCC 1972. 
(3) "Approaching the Minicomputer on a Silicon Chip - Progress 
and Expectations for LSI Circuits". H.G. Rudenberg. SJCC 
1972. 
(4) "Programmable Logic Controllers". G. Lapidus. Control En-
gineering April 1971 and N. Andreiev. Control Engineering 
Sept. 1972. 
(5) "MOS/LSI launches the Low-Cost Processor". G. Lapidus. 
IEEE Spectrum Nov. 1972. 
(6) "Review of Current Proposed Technologies for Mass Storage 
Systems" R.E. Matick. Proc. IEEE vol. 60 no. 3, 1972. 
(?) "Silicon Disk Memories ..." S.W. Fields. Electronics 24/5 
1971. 
(8) "Common Bus Structure for Minicomputers Improves 1-0 Flex-
ibility". P. Janson. Control Engineering, Jan. 1971. 
(9) "Evolution Breeds a Minicomputer ...". R.J. Clayton et al. 
Electronics 11/10/71. 
(10) "Direct Function Processor". S.B. Dinman. Computer Design. 
March 1970. 
(11) "Stored Program Control of Exchanges Using a Multiprocessor 
System". J.M. Cotton. IEE Conf. Pub. 
(12) CAMAC Specifications, "A Module Instrumentation System for 
Data Handling". EUR 4l00e. "Organization of Multi-crate 
Systems". EUR 4600e. "Specification of Amplitude Analogue 
Signals". EUR 5100e. 
(!') "Line S har i tip- Systems r!. R.L. Aronson. Control Engineer-
ing. Jan. 1971. 
(14) "'A Data Highway System". F. Inose et al. Instrumentation 
Technology. 1971:18:1. 
(1^) '"What's New in Automatic Process Control". H. Simon. 
Chemical Engineering. 11/9-72. 
(lb) ''MEDIA - A Continuous Digital Process Control System". 
J.R. Halsell et al. IEE Conf. Puh. 85, 4/72. 
(17) "Electronics Review7'. Electronics 9/10-72, s. 39« 
(18) See for example EDN 1/7/72, s. 2H or ''Special Issue on In-
formation Display Devices". IEEE Transactions Vol. ED-18 
No. 9, 1971. 
(19) "Digital Brain on a Digital Valve". A.W. Langell Jr. Con-
trol Engineering. Dec. 1972. 
- 29 -
SECTION III 
Developments in Software and Programming 
The technological developments which have been described 
previously will have a direct impact on the software which will 
be required as well as on the tools and methods which will be-
come available for generating this software. However, to indi-
cate present practice and experience, the results of a recent 
American survey (1) of process control users may be of interest. 
They indicated that only about 28iS utilized a higher-level 
language (mostly FORTRAN) while 25% still employed direct ma-
chine language and the rest assembly language for their appli-
cations programming. This can be contrasted with Danish experi-
ence which rests on the use of ALGOL or a macro-assembler ap-
proach for those systems which currently are operational. The 
disadvantages of lower-level languages are well known. The pre-
dicted developments in the price of computer store should remove 
any lingering reservations about the need to save on memory space 
by using machine or assembly language. 
However, the universally acceptable and implemented higher-
level equivalent is not yet available and there are few signs of 
its imminent appearance. Typical of the efforts underway in this 
direction are those of the Purdue Workshop on the standardization 
of industrial computer languages which has been active for the 
past four or five years in the following areas: 
- extension of FORTRAN (because of its popularity) to serve 
as at least one of a set of available procedural languages 
for process control. This standardization effort is ex-
pected to be complete in 197^-5 and represents the short-
term solution to an application programming language 
- development of a so-called long-term procedural language 
expressly for real-time applications (see Pike (2)). This 
is an international effort and a single unanimous result 
cannot be expected to emerge within the time era relevant 
here, although implementations of various specific pro-
posals are likely - indeed, they have already occurred (3). 
- development of problem-oriented packages which perhaps, 
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through use of macro-processor or other techniques, will 
permit each user to define his own application-based 
language. Here again, the expected reduction in hardware 
costs will make this approach more attractive. 
For at least the next five years, however, process computer 
systems will continue to be manufacturer-dependent. Nevertheless, 
hardware developments and the influence of, for example, micro-
programming on the ability of computers to execute in hardware 
in a flexible and alterable (if desired) way that which today 
must be accomplished via software will supplement the trend 
toward manufacturer-supported high-level "standard" programming 
languages and program packages for their main market areas. 
An increased use of distributed computers of various sizes 
and complexity in process control applications creates a some-
what altered environment for programming and will probably lead 
to more widespread use for the "software factory" idea (4) & (5). 
This consists of a computer for the high-level language, a utili-
ty library of building block software modules, powerful debugging 
facilities and a host computer capable of supporting all of these. 
The output of the "factory" is an object program capable of run-
ning on the specific process computer with also the possibility 
for loading a writable ROM in the target machine with the opti-
mum instruction set. The possibility for building up and continu-
ally expanding the library of software modules in the host is 
particularly attractive - this could include 
- components for the development of special language 
processors 
- operating system modules 
- on-line application modules 
- user interface modules 
- etc-
As an indication that this is far from a remote possibility, for 
example, the latest IFV system will be programmed on a large 
host computer while the resultant object programs will be exe-
cuted on the actual smaller process machines. 
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::•>•.'£var. Testing and Check-out 
Although techniques for modular program development are 
still not widely used to full advantage, we should see their 
use increasing rapidly over the next five years, along with the 
move away from assembly language programming. 
Two sorts of technique are possible for dividing software 
into modules - division into subroutines and procedures, and 
division into 'tasks' or 'processes'. The second of these will 
become more popular than today, as multiprocessor computers be-
come more common for control computing. We can expect to see 
much more powerful program testing facilities, allowing a high 
level language approach to debugging. The presence of displays 
during program development will encourage the use of more check 
data during testing. The effect of this should be to make pro-
gram development more rapid, and less error prone. 
One of the major areas of development in software tech-
niques over the past two years has been in program proving tech-
niques. These allow a programmer to check the consistency of a 
program with its specification. The techniques still require ex-
cessive effort and cannot be applied to complete systems. But 
within five years, knowledge of such techniques should have 
spread far enough to have been used in checking the more com-
plex parts of some systems. At the same time, the use of such 
techniques should lead to improvements in quality of program 
specification and design. 
The overall effect should be both to decrease the time for 
debugging of a system, and to increase the size of software 
systems without making them unmanageable. 
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SECTION IV 
Control Computer Structures for Power Plant 
Computing power for power plant control can be provided in 
a great many ways, with different degrees of distribution, and 
different levels of redundancy to ensure reliability. 
Computing equipment might in some case3 be able to offer 
relatively intangible benefits (for which the value is difficult 
to determine, although it may be large). Examples are increases 
in control system flexibility (important during commissioning 
and for plant modifications); improvement in control quality 
(though this may be difficult to achieve); better presentation 
of information to the operator; and reduction in the number of 
operators required. 
However, the objective here is to find the costs of a com-
puter control system, since this may now be lower than the costs 
for conventional equipment. There are some difficulties in using 
computing equipment for control purposes. One is the cost of 
software. Purchased software is not generally suitable for power 
plant control, except in the case where a completely packaged 
control system is purchased from a manufacturer with experience 
in computer control of power plant. Some manufacturer supplied 
operating system, compiling, and utility programs, are useful. 
But for a fully computerized system, about 100 K of additional 
programs are required, i.e. about 10-20 man years effort, or be-
tween t 80 and $ 360,000. A good proportion of this sum would be 
required for design of an equivalent analogue control system, 
but if analogue backup equipment is provided, the software rep-
resents a pure excess cost. 
The cost of software, and the cost of gaining experience, 
can be greatly reduced if one team is used to produce several 
systems. If similar machines are used, or software is written 
in a standard high level language, costs and software error rates 
may be further reduced, by reusing software. 
A further problem with computer control of power plant is 
the rapid rate of change of computer technology. This makes re-
design of systems desirable over periods as short as four years, 
and limits the extent to which software can be reused for new 
plants. 
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A. final problem with computer control is that of software 
errors. They are generally not critical, in that they can be 
quickly cured by restarting a computer system. But they represent 
an operational inconvenience, and may occasionally lead to trip-
ping the power plant. Special care needs to be taken in design 
to overcome these problems, and additional software and hardware 
is required. 
Reliability Requirement 
Most of the individual units such as processors, store mod-
ules, and multiplexers in control computer systems have a mean 
time between failures of between 10,000 and 30,000 hours. Repair 
times depend on working conditions, but vary between 1 and 2*1 
hours, usually. Exceptions to these general rules are line print-
ers, typewriters, disc stores, and very large processors. 
A convenient way to determine the required level of redund-
ancy in a computer configuration, is to evaluate the capitalized 
cost of failures for the component. If this is greater than the 
cost of the component, an additional redundant unit should be 
added. If components are already duplicated, an alternative way 
of increasing reliability is to allow cross coupling, so that, 
for example, if one disc store and one processor fail, a second 
store and processor can be interconnected easily, even if they 
were not usually used together. An objective of computer system 
design should be that if a component fails, and a replacement is 
available, replacement should take place sufficiently quickly 
that it is unnecessary to trip the power plant. 
The costs due to plant shut down can be arrived at in the 
following ways: 
- It is more expensive to produce electricity in older, or 
reserve plant, or to buy from other supply authorities. 
- More capital equipment is required to provide reserve 
capacity. 
- Costs for spinning reserve and warm standby operation of 
some plants. 
- A cost in the residual danger of a major system break-
down, resulting from several plant failures close in time. 
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Some of these costs are difficult to determine, but the 
largest items are for spinning reserve and standby capacity. The 
optimum level of spare capacity depends largely on plant avail-
ability. 
Costs of critical failures can be estimated, using for ex-
ample, the approach given in (1). These costs can serve as a 
guide for determining both whether control system redundancy 
should be used, and what form it should take. Ref. (1) gives 
$ 25-50 per megawatt day as an approximation to the financial 
loss due to plant shutdown. These costs are somewhat lower than 
the German values, given in (1) and approximately the same as 
the CEGB's (Jervis). 
They can be expressed in terms of unavailability (MTTR/ 
(MTTR+MTBF)) in that 1% of unavailability (approximately 100 
hours or 4 days per year) is equivalent to ($ 25-50) x 500 mW x 
4 days = $ 50,000-100,000 per percent of unavailability per year. 
Thus, using (l)fs terminology, an improvement of 1% in availabil-
ity is equivalent to a capitalized saving of $ 320-6*10,000. A 
value of $ 500,000 will be assumed in the examples given later. 
As an example of how this works out in practice, a minicom-
puter processor has a mean time between failures of about 10,000 
hrs. and a mean time to repair of about 10 hrs. If it is essen-
tial to plant operation, it contributes about 0.1? to plant un-
availability, or about $ 50,000 in capitalized costs. Duplication 
up to this cost is worthwhile, unless there is some simpler and 
cheaper strategy for keeping the plant operating. In practice, 
such duplication would cost about $ 10,000, but provision of a 
limited (analogue) backup system for the more rapidly varying 
plant variables, and manual control facilities for the other 
variables might be even cheaper. 
Control Hardware 
The number of possible arrangements of computing equipment 
is very large. An attempt has been made in the following pages, 
to make a fairly thorough comparison of the different structures. 
Some points of technical interest concerning the most promising 
structures are also made. 
The base line for the control system design is a 500 MW con-
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ventional power plant. Conventional, fully automated instrumen-
tation of such a system involves 
800 discrete output signals 
10Q0 analogue measurements 
1300 discrete signals 
30 analogue output signals 
50 PID ratio controllers 
30 A/NI stations 
40 summing amplifiers 
30 high/low selectors and limiters 
7 sequential controllers - Turbine run up 
Start up 
Shutdown 
Load changing 
Peed pump control 
Burner control 
Synchronization 
The approximate present day costs for computer hardware compo-
nents are as follows: 
Miniprocessor, 16 hit with clock 
4 K words of store 
Peripheral multiplexer, IS channel 
2 M byte disc unit + controller 
Line printer 
Console typewriter 
Raster display, with own store and driver 
Disc store duplexer 
I/O bus switch 
8 way store multiport unit 
Paper tape equipment (for programming) 
reader/punch 
Cassette tape equipment (for programming) 
A/D converter, 1000 channel 
D/A converter, 32 channel 
Digital input/output, 2000 channel 
* 
* 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
* 
t 
$ 
$ 
$ 
* 
* 
$ 
* 
6,000 
2,000 
5,000 
10,000 
18,000 
3,000 
12,000 
2,000 
2,000 
5,000 
1,000 
4,000 
80,000 
10,000 
70,000 
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MTBP, hrs. 
10,000 
10,000 
20,000* 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
200-1,000 
MTT., hl-s 
2 
2 
4« 
K 
2 
10 
1 
Mean times to failure and repair times can be estimated as fol-
lows: 
Miniprocessor 
k K block of store 
Peripheral multiplexer 
Line printer 
Console typewriter 
Disc store 
A/D converter, 1000 lines 
8 way store multiport unit 10,000 2 
estimated by comparison with processor. 
The figures are based on a range of predicted and observed 
values for modern equipment, the values being 'typical1. For de-
sign of specific systems, manufacturers'data should be used. The 
MTTR values assume that maintenance staff are always available, 
with a full set of testing aids, including test software. For 
most systems, there are a few 'unexpected' failures with extreme-
ly long repair time, involving delays of days, or even weeks. 
Computer Configurations 
To make evaluation of different computer configurations 
simpler, the overall computer system has been divided into the 
following subsystems: 
Control console 
Computer 
I/O systems. 
For each of these areas there are several possible alternative 
design solutions. The result is & very large number of system 
structures. The approach taken here is to select the best alter-
natives for each subsystem, and combine them. In some cases, 
there is no freedom to combine good subsystem alternatives in 
this way, since some alternatives in different subsystems are 
naturally paired. 
The tasks assumed for the control system include: 
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- Direct digital control of plant variables 
- Sequence control, and display of progress 
- Display console suppoi*t 
- Alarm monitoring and display 
- Reporting/supervision 
- Logging 
- Sequence of events analysis after incidents 
Control Console 
It is assumed here that raster displays, with 16 K bytes of 
semiconductor storage for each display are used, since these rep-
resent the best solution to the display problem currently. Commer-
cial colour television monitors are used as final elements in the 
display system. Multicolour plasma or multiphosphor CRT displays 
may be available by 2 974, with sufficient reliability. They should 
enable costs to be reduced, and the discrimination and hence den-
sity of information, on the screens, to be improved. 
It is assumed for the purpose of the examples here that five 
displays are required. Displays of this kind have a mean time be-
tween failure of about 2000 hours. Assuming a repair time of four 
hours, the availability is 0.2SÉ, with a capitalized of $ 100,000. 
At least one spare is justified. The availability of a group of 
six units, five of which are required for convenient operation is 
0.004iE, with a capitalized cost of $ 2,000. Provision of further 
redundancy is not justified, in terms of complete units. 
In practice, a large proportion of the display system fail-
ures are likely to be within the display monitors themselves. 
Spares, and extra units for closed circuit television, monitors, 
cost about $ 400. They could be made interchangeable using co-
axial plugging. Both displays and console keyboards should be ar-
ranged so as to be easily movable, in order not to disturb the 
control configuration while some equipment is heing required. It 
is possible to envisage operating the system with reduced control 
capabilities, if more than one of the display systems should fail. 
Software switching is used to move pictures between displays. 
The essential components of a raster display system are shown 
in Fig. 3. A configuration is shown in ^'ig. 4 with two display 
processors provided. The processors serve to translate display 
- 39 -
High speed link 
< -* P 
to processor 
sub-system 
Console 
inputs 
Video data 
Color 
2-port 
Pig. 3. Essential Components for raster display 
P = Processor 
S = Store 
DG = Display generator 
MUX= Multiplexer 
Fig. 5. Multiprocessor connection to displays 
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data from the compressed form used in other parts of the system 
into point or vector form used by the displays. The unavailabil-
ity of the processors individually is approximately .02$, and of 
the pair (one processor and one display failed) is 4 x lO--1 $, 
with a capitalized value of $ 200. Further redundancy is not 
justified, provided it is possible to operate in a limited way 
with only three displays, while repair takes place. Given the as-
sumptions made sofar, the best way of adding redundancy to the 
system is to provide an extra display on each of the processors, 
if operation with only three displays is considered difficult. 
A fairly high speed data link to other parts of the control 
system is required, if pictures on the displays are to be changed 
at a sufficiently high speed. 
The cost of a system like that of Pig. U is $ 90 K, based 
on the costs for one commercially available system, A marginal 
saving can be made if a multiprocessor system is used, by com-
bining the display processors into the rest of the multiprocessor 
system (Fig. 5). 
Of particular value to a user would be a method for generat-
ing new display programs easily. The amount of software involved 
for accepting pictures from a main computer, for providing a good 
display interface, for using tracker ball or similar pointer de-
vices, and for picture switching, and for providing a general key-
board handling program, is about 4 K. In addition, about 4-8 K of 
display store is required to hold pictures. The software required 
for new display hardware might take 2 man years, to provide the 
basic display facilities. In addition, each picture to be dis-
played required 1-2 man months of design, programming, and editing 
time, even when the basic principles of design are well understood, 
and aids to picture generation have been provided. 
Pig, 6 shows a possible data flow scheme in display software. 
Significant decisions to be made in the design of the display soft-
ware are the degree of structuring in the picture file and in the 
picture formats; whether the data transfers should be active 
(fetch) or passive (send), which affects the failure properties of 
the software; and how to organize error recovery in the case of 
hardware or software failure. Note the picture location table, re-
quired to enable pictures to be moved from one screen to another 
in the case of failure. This should also allow one picture to be 
replicated on several screens. 
As was stated earlier, computer-controlled control rooms 
are now commercially available. The important issue is the ef-
fect future developments in the degree of automation employed 
in process plant will have on control room function and re-
quirements. 
Processor Subsystem 
An assumption will be made in describing different proces-
sor structures that direct digital control is used, at least as 
far as the primary (non-standby) control is concerned. One way 
of justifying this assumption is that computer data logging and 
data display are already provided in many power plants, and the 
additional cost to provide capacity for direct digital control 
is very low. Savings may then result from reducing the amount of 
analogue control equipment. It may be possible to reduce the 
overall cost of control equipment by using a completely digital 
control system, especially if advantage can be taken of reduc-
tions in cabling costs by using remote signal multiplexing. If a 
completely digital system is provided, the extra costs incurred 
are mostly in providing redundant equipment. As will be seen 
later, the dependence of the computer control system on a single, 
complex, computer system results in inadequate reliability. 
The basic hardware requirement fc. the processor subsystem 
is a single miniprocessor; disc store; a control typewriter; line 
printer for logging; cassette tape and paper tape equipment for 
programming. 
Several suitable minicomputers are available, with prices 
ranging between $ 3,000 and $ 12,000. The cost of processors is 
a relatively small part of the overall control system costs, and 
the choice should be made on the availability performance and 
cost of the other equipment associated with the processor; the 
availability of good control software or a good operating system 
and programming language; features for protection and ease of 
programming which make programs more reliable; and ease of re-
pairability of all of the components in the system. A price of 
$ 6,000 has been used as a basis for comparison here, because 
there at the moment are few systems commercially available with 
outstanding advantages, above th.is price. 
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Th>. amount of processing power for direct digital control, 
supervision and data logging, does not represent a large load 
for a modern miniprocessor. The load has fairly stringent timing 
requirements however. Changing pictures, alarm analysis, and up-
dating of trend curves, can produce a heavy, computational load 
during a short period. Careful attention must be paid to setting 
program priority levels. The problem is reduced in multiproces-
sor configurations, where the display generating computer is alsc 
available to take other peak loads. 
The amount of store required for the computer depends very 
much on how much of the program and data is stored on disc. This 
is partly a question of reliability. Historically, most of the 
application programs for a system, and the process data, have 
been stored on disc in large process control systems. However, 
disc store is one of the least reliable components in a computer 
system, with relatively difficult repair and replacement prob-
lems. With control relying on the proper working of a disc, two 
disc stores are easily justified. The unavailability is then 
0.012, with a capitalized value of $ 5,000. A third unit is not 
justified on the basis of these costs, but it seems worthwhile 
to seek alternative ways of increasing reliability. 
An alternate approach, which is especially attractive for 
the redundant system structures to be described later, offers a 
higher availability TOT "essential" functions and, at the same 
time, can relieve timing problems associated with access to 
backing store by providing sufficient main store to permit these 
functions to operate without backing store. The disadvantage in 
a single processor system is that backing store is still re-
quired for system re-load after a failure so that dependence on 
this critical element is still a factor. This dependence can be 
minimized by incorporating protection features to reduce the 
propagation of errors throughout main store and by using a 
structural approach to recovery procedures which uses backing 
store only as a last resort. 
It is important with an expanded fast store to compress 
process data, sequential control programs, picture formats, 
trend data, etc,, using table and list techniques. The success 
of the approach will depend on the success of these techniques, 
and experimental developments of new control aids may necessi-
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opera t ing system 
process data 
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background program execution area 
p ic tu re formats 
display generat ion programs 
frequently used trend data 
messages 
sequential control tables 
with reserve. 
Less flexible systems with half this quantity of store have 
been constructed, using disc storage to allow a degree of pro-
gram swapping. Addition of a cheap ($ 1,000) 'floppy disc' store 
can give an extra capability for running less frequently used 
programs, during repair of the main disc, but will generally not 
be sufficiently fast for logging. 
The unavailability of a single processor subsystem, consist-
ing of a processor, 18 K store, disc, and keyboard is the sum of 
the individual unavailabilities. 
UNAVAILABILITY 
8 
1
 0 
8 
;> 
1; 
2 
2 
2 
2_ 
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48 
K 
K 
K 
K 
K 
K 
K 
_K 
K 
K 
words 
words 
words 
words 
words 
•words 
words 
words 
words 
words 
words 
Processor 
48 K store 
Disc store 
Control keybc ard 
$ 6,000 
$ 24,000 
% 10,000 
$ 3,000 
0.02% 
.24* 
1.0 % 
0.02? 
$ ^3,000 1.3* full function 
0.3* without disc 
In practice, better of availability than this have 
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been achieved at some installations. However, in many cases 
there are transient failures and software failures, which re-
quire good recovery and restart facilities, if such high avail-
ability is to be achieved. The capitalized value of unavail-
ability for a complete processor subsystem, even without a disc, 
is ^ $ 150,000, and some redundancy is justified. 
Analysis of event sequences (post incident analysis) is a 
special task, in that although reliability is not critical, special 
equipment is required. The equipment required consists of special 
multiplexers in order to buffer about 1000 incoming event signal 
lines, and a small computer to sample these lines. There is some 
advantage in connecting this subsystem to the computer system, to 
allow access to the display subsystem, and in some cases, to gain 
in reliability by allowing the ev<mt recording computer to be a 
standby for the control computers (shedding the event recording 
task). 
Redundant Structures 
There are two forms which a central, redundant computer sys-
tem ca.i take, the dual structure and the multiprocessor structure 
(other forms, with distributed processing, will be considered 
later). 
The dual system (Fig. 7) consists of two similar processor 
subsystems, connected by a switch or watchdog timer. Whenever 
one computer is active, and capable of running the plant, it 
periodically updates a register in this switch, and so indicates 
to the other computer that it must remain in a standby role. Com-
plete failure of the active computer, or a call of an error rou-
tine, or a manual signal from the operator, results in the switch 
not being updated, and the standby processor can take over- the 
active processor functions. 
The basic unavailability for the single processor system, 
without disc store, was shown to be 0.3*. The unavailability of 
the equivalent duplicate system is 0.0009* for "essential" func-
tions with a capitalized cost of $ ^50. Care must be taken in 
organizing the switching, multiplexing hardware in this config-
uration, and in perfecting the protection and recovery software, 
because there is a source of common mode failure in that pro-
grams and data are shared on a single disc. Loading a faulty copy 
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of a program can cause complete failure of the system. The low 
unavailability for essential programs involves an extra net cost 
due to the addition of 2 x 21 K of fast store and a disc multi-
plexer minus the cost of one disc (or in all about $ 20,000). 
If a dual disc system is used, the problems of common mode 
failure are avoided, or, if both discs are connected to both pro-
cessor subsystems, reduced to a negligible level. For a simple 
dual system with two discs, the unavailability is 0.012J with a 
capitalized value of $ 6,000. For a cross coupled system, with 
both discs connected to both processors (Fig. 8) the unavailabil-
ity is 0.0112 with a capitalized value of $ 5,500, so the advant-
age of being able to use both discs on both processors is at least 
marginal, from an economic point of view. 
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SW MUX D 
4 *-
Display sub-system Processor sub-syste 
Pig. 7» Dual processor system. 
^ * to peripheral 
sub-system 
to peripheral 
-* sub-system 
MUX = multiplexer 
SW = switch 
D = disc/drum 
Display 
processors | MUX | IDI |MUX| [D] 
Fig. 8. System with dual processors, and dual, 
cross coupled,discs. 
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A dual system can be operated in either of two ways. The 
first requires only one computer to perform the control tasks, 
the second being available for background work. If the active 
or control computer fails, the standby or background computer 
can be loaded with programs, and started on the control tasks. 
In a modern system using disc store for programs, the time for 
this reload process can be reduced to a few minutes. 
The second way of operating a duplicate computer system is 
for both computers to run at the same time, performing all the 
control calculations. However, output is provided by only one 
computer, depending on status of the watchdog time/switch. In 
this parallel operation mode, recovery from failure is much more 
rapid, because all process data is available instantly to the 
standby computer, without an initial period for loading pro-
grams and gathering initial values of process data. A disadvant-
age is that twice as much data transfer capacity is required in 
the process data input system. If sueh a system is operated with 
a single disc, very great care is required in software design, to 
avoid the possibility of common mode failure for the duplicate 
processors. 
Dual computer systems are available from process controller 
and computer manufacturers. Software can be purchased For systems 
where one computer serves as a backup, or standard control soft-
ware can be modified with little difficulty. For the parallel mode 
of operation, special applications software is generally required. 
The cost of a duplicate system including two discs, two pro-
cessors with 48 K of store in all, three console typewriters, 
paper tape, cassette tape, and two line printers, is approximate-
ly $ 107*000 (see Table 6) (the line printers, paper tape, and 
cassette tape are mounted in the input-output subsystem, but are 
included here for convenience - being part of the computer equip-
ment, rather than the 'process interface*). A separate event re-
cording computer costs approximately $ 30,000 without any special 
display facilities. 
A multiprocessor system offers the potential for very high 
availability, without an excessive cost, because full interchange-
ability of modules is inherent in the structure. For example, if 
three store modules of 16 K words each are required in the basic 
system, and two spare modules are provided, then the unavailabil-
To 
I/O, process I/O 
All multi-port 
2k K 
blocks 
EH 
fr4 
C = controller n 
To display 
sub-system 
| A 
Event 
scanning 
Fig, 9, Multiprocessor system with control and 
display functions integrated. 
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Ity Jue to .-toiv? ^o-iule failure is approximately 3 x 10~ , that 
is, three days in 100,000 yrs. However, the increases in avail-
ability only become really high when there is more than one spare 
available. Advantage can be taken of the high availability of a 
multiprocessor system, however, if some processor tasks are re-
garded as dispensable during the rare situations of multiple fail-
ures. Examples are the logging of less important process vari-
ables, event recording, report generation, etc. 
To take full advantage of a multiprocessor configuration, all 
of the essential functions such as display, direct digital control, 
and event recording should be grouped into one multiprocessor con-
figuration. This allows all of the computing power to be used in 
performing essential tasks during an emergency, and at the same 
time, reduces the amount of spare capacity required. Pig. 9 shows 
a configuration which is near optimal, within the range of con-
figurations available. 96 K words of store are provided, divided 
into four blocks, one of which is regarded as spare. The remain-
ing 72 K provides for the basic process control store requirement, 
plus display and event scan programs. Pour processors allow one 
to be devoted to control, one to display, and one to event scan-
ning, at any time, with one spare. 
The unavailability of such a configuration is determined by 
the disc stores, if these are essential to operation, 0.01% with 
a capitalized value of $ 5,000. If dependence on disc store is 
avoided, then the unavailability is determined largely by the 
main store availability, and is approximately 0.001%, with a ca-
pitalized value of $ 500. If an approach is taken which allow 
less important tasks to be shed, then periods of unavailability 
are unlikely during the lifetime of the system. 
The good availability characteristics of a multiprocessor 
system bring some disadvantages, however. One is that the failure 
rate for such a system is high, and good restart facilities are 
needed for switching between processors, if the very high avail-
ability levels are to be achieved in practice. Another problem is 
that very good protection mechanisms are required between hard-
ware and software components, if they are not to damage each other. 
The result of such damage is to require extra 'cold restarts1 of 
the system, taking some few minutes. But the effects could be an-
noying to operators. Multiprocessor system software in general re-
a c -
quires much more careful design with respect to interprogram pro-
tection, and error recovery, than for single or dual computer 
systems. 
Recovery from store failure in a multiprocessor system can-
not be so fast as for a parallel execution dual system, since 
programs must be reloaded. To allow reliable reload of programs, 
two cheap disc (floppy disc) or casette tape stores may be pro-
vided. 
The store multiplexers (multiport units) in a multiproces-
sor system are relatively expensive. Some saving in cost can be 
achieved by using a configuration such as Fig. 10, but with some 
additional costs in software complexity. The cost of the system 
overall is approximately $ 167,000. 
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Pig. 10. Reduced multiprocessor system. 
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Input/Output Subsystem 
The input/output subsystem for a 500 Mtf power plant provides 
some 1000 analogue channels with an average sampling time of about 
1 sec; 2000 digital channels for data logging and on-off control; 
30 digital to analogue converter channels for modulating control; 
1000 channels for rapid event scanning; and channels for data log-
ging line printers, tape recorders, cassette and paper tape equip-
ment. 
The input/output subsystem is one of the most expensive in 
the overall cost of the computer system. A large part of this cost 
lies in the signal conditioning equipment which must be devoted to 
each process data signal line, to change voltage levels, and to 
provide noise filtering. 
A non-redundant system which provides flying capacitor multi-
plexing and noise filtering on 1000 analogue signal lines costs 
about $ 80,000. The cost can be reduced and the reliability in-
creased at the same time, by using solid state multiplexing, 
rather than using reed relays. But problems of common mode noise 
are increased. The cost of analogue to digital conversion and 
multiplexing is generally between $ 40 and $ 80 per line. The 30 
digital to analogue converters cost about $ 8,300. The cost of 
on/off inputs and outputs is also high, due to the need for iso-
lation, for achieving a high enough signal level for relay oper-
ation, and for providing the correct contact characteristics in 
the case of power failure (latching, open-on-fail, close-on-fail). 
For 2000 line3, the cost is about $ 75,000. For alarm monitoring 
inputs, the cost can be reduced by using matrix multiplexers, but 
reliability is lower. 
The failure characteristics of a computer input/output sys-
tem are different from the failure of analogue signal transmit-
ters, receivers, and cabling. Fig. 11 shows the general configur-
ation of a large multiplexer input subsystem. Failure of an in-
dividual component in such a system can affect many input lines. 
The most frequent failures occur in the signal conditioning com-
ponents, since these are the most numerous, and include electro-
mechanical relays. Such a failure affects only one signal line, 
but repair may affect several signal lines. 
Reducing the degree of multiplexing in each unit, before 
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reaching the processor, reduces the chance of many signals being 
affected simultaneously, and reduces the repair problems. Using 
a larger number of units with a smaller number of lines can also 
save costs, under modern price conditions. But the failure rate 
for the input/output system is still high, w5th an unavailability 
for all signal lines, of about 116. Some degree of redundancy is 
required, but full redundancy is expensive. 
There are various ways of implementing any required redund-
ancy - the choice requires a careful and thorough analysis at the 
design stage. For example, in many cases, the choice of process 
inputs is far from systematic but instead is based on tradition, 
cost, vendor requirements, etc. Before one begins to consider re-
dundancy, factors such as the use and usefulness of each I/O 
point, its criticalness, its relation to other parameters, the 
possibilities for computer detection and compensation in case of 
failure, etc. must be taken into account since they play an im-
portant role in establishing the required back-up. 
Actual forms for redundancy in process I/O include the fol-
lowing: 
- complete duplication 
- use of an m-out-of-n strategy 
- employment of diversity - for example 
a) coupling of the same I/O point via several paths 
b) use of alternate data 
c) use of relevant functional relationships. 
Reference (2) expands on the use of the computer in improv-
ing plant integrity. 
Most analogue data gathering subsystems today are based on 
the configuration shown in Pig. 11. Alternatives for achieving 
high-reliability are shown in Pigs. 12 and 13. They depend to 
a large extent on the type of processor redundancy employed. 
These alternatives offer in varying degrees the possibili-
ties for 
. duplication of analogue and digital input-output -
either partial or fully 
. sharing of redundant I/O between redundant processors 
. distributed multiplexing. 
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(a) Pure duplicate system, for standby or parallel running 
redundant processors, duplicate I/O equipment. 
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(b) System with transfer switches, for standby redundant 
processors, duplicate or partially redundant I/O equipment. 
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(c) Flexible system with sharable I/O multiplexers, and small 
separate I/O units, duplicate or partially redundant I/O 
equipment, for parallel running redundant processors. 
Fig. 12. Duplicate processor I/O. 
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Fig. 13. Multiprocessor I/O. 
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Two different types of switching are involved for automatic 
changeover between dual computers; active switching in a standby 
system, in which the active processor locks out the standby sys-
tem by periodically renewing the status of the switch; and pas-
sive switching in the parallel execution systems (and multipro-
cessor systems). 
Some redundancy of interconnection seems desirable, since 
it is available relatively cheaply, and offers both reliability 
and operational advantages. 
Systems like the third in Fig. 12, which allow both proces-
sors access to all input and output signals continuously by using 
a multiplexer with two ports, rather than a switch, allow the op-
erator t- .lenan-i i.rofis checks of instruments and channels, with-
out, jvr.':••'. '-''••" t-*'°'-~-'~A^-"< Such capabilities are inherent in the 
niultlproc^sor systems. Suitable switches and multiplexers are 
available commercially,, 
Most of the remaining equipment for I/O could be duplicated 
although some, such as magnetic tape, may not require such care. 
Line printers provide hard copy print out most reliably. 
Distributed 1/0 
A complete alternative to the multiplexing systems described 
above, is to provide a plant communication system, with analogue 
to digital converters etc. located local to the instruments and 
actuators to which they are connected. By using digital transmis-
sion over the longer distances, problems of noise are reduced. 
See (3) for a recent survey and (4) for further details. The sav-
ings in cabling oust with this type of system are high. Saving 
has been quoted as $ 70 per signal line in a refinery in USA, To 
set against this, remote multiplexing equipment costs about $ 50 
per point, <.,r between $ 100 and $ *400 including analogue to digi-
tal conversion equipment. The best configurations, with present 
day prices, depends on the degree of redundancy required for pro-
cess signals and the current level of wiring costs. 
because of the cyclic nature of the sampling on such sys-
tems the response time to alarm inputs can be slow (1/10 sec -
1/Jl sen), i^ ome systems allow a limited number of interrupt lines, 
with a few milliseconds delay at most. But the available communi-
>.'.ationr; systems cannot be used ror fast event recording, or for 
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rapid response to alarm or sequential control signals. The total 
cost of such a system would be about $ 200,000 - * 300,000 at 
present day prices, which compares favourably with the costs of 
$ 160,000 for centralized input/output equipment, and conven-
tional cabling costs (see Fig. 14). 
Most of these systems require a small computer to provide 
sequencing and routing of signals. If the equipment can be inte-
grated into a multiprocessor system, the reliability should be 
greatly enhanced. 
A recent Japanese development (5) represents an additional 
step forward in this area. This "data highway" system utilizes 
high speed serial transmission over a double coaxial cable loop 
with provision for random access to all sensors and actuators 
as well as interrupt facilities. It is based on the use of low 
cost LSI devices and furthermore, the method of transformer 
coupling which is employed between the highway and each station 
insures a minimum of disturbance to the system in case of station 
failure. No price data are available at this data (Spring 1973) 
(see Fig. 15). 
In general, there is nothing to prevent the use of a diver-
sified approach which combines various of these types of systems 
so as to match the varying conditions in the plant as regards 
sampling, response time, et;c. In this way, one could, for ex-
ample, retain a quick-acting event scanning subsystem in its 
present form and divide the remaining input-output into appropri-
ate distributed chunks. 
Distributed Processing 
The computer configurations described earlier provided 'com-
puting power' as a source, in one central block. The availability 
of mini and micro computers makes it possible to consider more 
distributed forms of processing, with smaller units dedicated to 
particular classes of work. 
There are two forms that such specialization could reason-
ably take; according to type of calculation performed; or accord-
ing to type of equipment controlled. 
Retaining minicomputers of the form which are well estab-
lished today, two configurations are shown in Fig. 16. The ad-
vantage of the first configuration is more connected with division 
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:' --:• ••'.-.• Il: lity, than with mechanical problems. In many caset;, 
fj:-L->frem*rator and boiler are supplied by different organisations. 
It LJ é\. S:5LL1^: to separate control functions with only a minimal 
Ir.tervhangu of information between the two subsystems. The boiler 
„•o'Lti'ol computer is treated as the main computer for display and 
o^.-'trol purposes since the turbine control logic is more criti-
cal , and hence less adaptable. The boiler control computer issues 
t.h-? main power demand and high level sequencing signals to the 
tui'bine c-ntrcl computer, and receives responses, data for re-
v-'jfding and display and alarm signals in return. Such a system 
rv.. - an a-'-'iiticnal cost, over that for earlier configurations, be-
C-. i. y extra processors must be used, and extra store provided 
:• • p"o,r im, for display, and the operating system. Also, if the 
j;. jteir.:; a>-c •:••..npletely separate, extra disc store must be pro-
vided. Dual computers with 24 K of store, and dual discs, could 
be used for each subsystem, resulting in an additional cost of 
some $ 50,000. 
Fig. 16(b) shows a central control computer, devoted to data 
logging and display with some additional switching and high level 
control functions. Two direct digital control subsystems are pro-
vided, one for the boiler and one for the turbogenerator. The ad-
vantage is that only a limited amount of software and hardware 
are used in the direct digital control subsystems, improving re-
liability. The direct digital control components still need to be 
duplicated, however, for reliability. The direct digital control 
computers need between 4 and 8 K words of store, of which a large 
part is for process data. Also, some local store, for program 
loading, is desirable on the direct digital control computers, 
perhaps provided by a 'floppy disc' store. The additional cost of 
this equipment should be about $ 50,000, over the cost of a cen-
tral dual computer system. The falling cost of minicomputers should 
have a considerable effect on this figure however. The availability 
of small, cheap, bulk memories such as bubble memory, should also 
help to make a configuration of this sort more attractive. 
A system like the processor system of Fig. 16(b) would have a 
very high availability, as far as normal control was concerned. 
The remote stations for boiler and turbine control are small, and 
hence have a high hardware availability. And by separating off the 
Immediate digital control programs, the chances of software fail-
62 -
ure are reduced. 
Looking further into the future, systems with a higher de-
gree of distribution should be possible. Development along two 
different lines is likely arising out of present day growth in 
desk calculator capabilities, in cheap, 'stripped down1 computers 
for automating mass produced goods such as machine tools, and in 
the development of digital 'three term* controllers. For control 
system applications, all of these developments will depend on im-
provements in plant communication systems. 
One form for a distributed control system can be seen in the 
modern 'energy balance1 control systems, which incorporate a large 
number of feed forward interconnections to individual actuator 
controllers. Fig. 17 shows the structure of such a system. 'Func-
tional group controllers', one for each of the major controlled 
variables, serve for local adjustment of actuators, in response 
to signals from a 'load demand1 computer. The local controllers 
are responsible for starting and adjusting equipment in response 
to system state signals, and for different levels of load demand. 
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Fig, 17. Functionally distributed control system. 
-'•\.;p'.ny nf data, an,: -jul^uiation of tuning :intl p«-: Vov. •:• ;.-•?, 
are e?.*-riei out by a control room computer. 
Trit hardware for such a scheme might consist of uttnviur i 
cor.p:t.-5 Intended primarily for che desk calculator m.-Érku*,. 
These ure cheap, easily programmed, and already used in dat-; !'-r-
g^ng applications. Currently, these cost about * 6,000 each ani 
duplication would be required to provide adequate reliability, 
but on this basis, the cost is comparable with other duplicate 
systems such as that of Fig. 7- More important, the cost of this 
type of computer is likely to drop more dramatically, because of 
mass production than for other computer types. At the moment, 
software for control applications is not available, and the com-
puters are somewhat underpowered. But the promise is good. 
Development in digital »process controllers' and 'programmed 
sequential controllers' is likely to lead in the same direction, 
but result in still smaller units, connected together via a data 
bus system. These would then be arranged in 'functional groups*. 
The direct application of conventional control system design tech-
niques and elimination of programming should make systems of this 
kind attractive in some applications, and then will benefit from 
large scale production for smaller control systems. 
An alternative to duplication of equipment in such systems, 
will be apparatus to detect unit failure, coupled with other 
equipment providing safety control, or switching to manual con-
trol. See Fig. l8 for an example. The feature of computer fail-
ure which, with proper design, leads to lack of output, makes 
this approach attractive, since failure in the 'safety' com-
puter will not lead directly to plant failures. Additionally, 
further conventional safety equipment can be integrated into the 
scheme. 
The biggest advantage of a distributed control system is the 
hardware isolation between different control functions. This 
means that the possibility of unwanted interactions in failure 
situations is very much reduced. 
All of the distributed instrumentation systems will depend 
on a good system of digital interconnection, to reduce noise prob-
lems and costs. The presently available plant communication sys-
tems are inadequate, because of low data capacity for transmis-
sion of rapid event data, and the difficulty of including inter-
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Fig. 18- Instrumentation failure detection and standby control. 
rupt signals. Loop systems, which provide 'moving communication 
slots', to be seized by a transmitting station in a similar way 
to a passing railway train carriage, have been developed for com-
puter interconnection at Bell Telephone Laboratories (6). Each 
message is sent to its appropriate address, or broadcast messages 
can De transmitted. 
In such a 'data train1 system, local stations are responsible 
for buffering messages, and retransmitting them to the next sta-
tion if the address of the data is unrecognized. Protection against 
failure can be provided, for example, by using a configuration 
where each station is responsible for checking the correct func-
tioning of the next station, for signalling failure, and for by-
passing the station until repair is completed. A system using 
2 M bit/sec communication channels shoull be capable of trans-
mitting up to 10,000 16 bit messages per second around a complete 
loop, or even more signals between closer points. Costs should be 
comparable with other plant communication systems, but the delay 
in accepting interrupt signals should be much lower than for cyclic 
sampling used in present multiplexing systems. 
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.-- • r,municacion bus such as the one described here could do 
mere than simply interface controllers and a control processor. 
It coul : serve for communication to displays, and for program 
interchange. Special programming support would be required, to 
simpllTy the construction of a system of this sort. An ideal 
would C:-. to provide software by 'drawing' the equivalent conven-
tional control circuitry, and the display layout, on the screen 
of an interactive display. Such a system would have a minimum of 
interaction effects between software units, and allow consider-
able redundancy both of equipment and control methods. The major 
cost for redundant components would be for additional analogue 
to digital conversion channels, A typical example is shown in 
Pig. 19. 
There are two basic modes of using such a communication sys-
tem - either with the analogue input and output components con-
nected directly to the bus, or with them connected to small mini-
computers. The ideal is for the analogue connection to the com-
munication bus to depend on as little hardware as possible, in 
order to reduce the probability of failure. However, some data 
reduction and filtering is necessary close to the analogue to 
digital conversion equipment, to reduce the amount of data trans-
mitted on the bus. 
Software 
Standard software, for data logging and for 'three term1 
algorithms for direct digital control, for limit alarm reporting, 
and for manual control, can be purchased. A major area of weak-
ness at present is in display software. For power plant control, 
also, many control loops require special non-linear algorithms. 
Performance evaluation and sequential control software must be 
supplied anew for each project. Purchasing software can create 
problems, in that engineering staff do not gain experience with 
programming. 
If only one plant is to be instrumented, the cost of soft-
ware can be very high. 10 man years would not be an unreasonable 
estimate for the software production time, starting from scratch, 
for the basic display plus control software. Development of spec-
ial training software, such as simulators, and aids to program-
ming such as sequential control languages, would add to this time. 
":-• .:;..-• can i:.-.;; be r::. >fi ^her t'-iar'. :'or i?-"!" , l::y>'.!t av.ri 
>•-!-1 i ng of a conve-ntiorr-iL cc rtroi sysr.en, .-•^ v.'evrr, rc.^ t cf these 
costs noed not recur, if a software production team ir kept to-
tret her, and programs are reused on several olants. T-- fiM li hate 
t'lis, either the a^tne programming language or the s^e computer, 
should be used on a series of installations. 
To avoid the risks involved in developing new software af-
*er the system has been accepted for use, the ideal is to provide 
a separate system for programming and testing. The cost of this 
is justified if the system is small, and used for programming 
for several installations; or if the programming system is also 
used for staff training. Such a system should cost about $ 40,000 
with display facilities. Alternatively, the standby computer in 
o. dual configuration could be used. Simulation testing before 
plant commissioning is essential, if no analogue control equip-
ment is provided. Otherwise, commissioning can be seriously de-
layed. 
Estimation of software reliability is difficult, due to the 
absence of data. But if there is one error per 1000 words of pro-
gram, the failure rate should be about one failure per three 
hours, due to simple, non-time dependent failures alone. Removal 
of such simple failures must be virtually 'complete1 (one per 
50,000 words) before performance becomes acceptable. In this si-
tuation, division of programs into separate 'tasks', and the use 
of addressing registers with address range limiting, is import-
ant to reduce the consequences of a failure. 
One form of software for a direct digital control system 
with sequential control functions is shown in Pig. 20. 
Some redundancy in software is one way of avoiding problems 
with software failures. For example, different routines can be 
used to provide a direct display channel, and separate programs 
for actuator operation, when controlling plant manually. To al-
low this, actuator operation signals should be incremental, so 
that two controllers can work in parallel if necessary, and it 
should be possible to shutdown control tasks manually, so that 
their effect ceases. 
When using a duplicate system, every effort should be made 
to keep copies of programs in the two halves of the system sep-
arate, so that an error in one half of the system does not cor-
rupt the other half. 
t.fl 
to display < Efficiency 
calculation 
Recording 
trends 
Display 
to display< Identification tuning 
Process 
mode l 
Display j < — Plant 
alarm signals 
Selection 
f i l ter ing 
| Parameter 
Level change | change 
& sensitivity I J 
adjustment 
X 
Manual 
in / out 
Sequential 
conlrol 
on-oft signals, 
Run up 
run back 
generator 
Romp signals, 
Data 
acquisition 
-J 
-i 
Three term 
lead bach 
control 
Actuator 
drive 
Special 
conlrol 
algorithm« 
Actuator 
~5 drive 
. , Digital 
output 
From all other 
modules 
Error 
module 
Recovery 
module 
. to display 
»to data acquisition 
M o reload 
> to sequential control M/l • manual input 
signals 
Pig. 20. General form of data flow in direct digital 
control software. 
References - Section IV 
(1) Kraftværkskontrol - Økonomisk vurdering af kraftværksauto-
matisering. DEFU 9/7/70. 
(•") "The Improvement of Plant Integrity Using a Process Control 
Computer". P.P. Lees. Measurement and Control 8/72. 
(3) "Line Sharing Systems". R.L. Aronson. Control Engineering 
1/71. 
(H) "Multiplex Systems Save Multibucks ...". H. Simon. ISA '70 
Conference - paper 70-510. 
(5) "A Data Highway System". F. Inose et al. Instrumentation 
Technology. 1/71. 
(6) Bell System Technical Journal 6/72. 
(7) "Economic Justification of Computer Control Systems". T.M. 
Stort - Automatica vol. 9, 1973, PP. 9-19. 
- 70 -
SECTION V 
Conclusions 
The descriptions given here have assumed that computer con-
trol systems will be used in preference to analogue systems. The 
use of computers in display and in sequential control functions 
is reasonably easy to justify on the basis of improved interface 
to the operator. But, as the cost and reliability figures given 
earlier show the cost for analogue and direct digital control are 
comparable. Savings in cabling costs by using plant communica-
tions systems may be a deciding factor. The cost of the cheapest 
configuration with a completely duplicated computer is approxi-
mately $ l|50,000.or $ 500,000 including a digital communications 
system to reduce cabling costs. 
As was shown earlier, a dual processor system with two discs 
is most effective, if attention is paid only to availability. A 
system in which most of the control functions are based in main 
storage, and with only one disc, may be well worthwhile if the 
problems of intermittent, rapidly recovered, failures are con-
sidered. 
A partially redundant, dual, input/output system, consisting 
of several independent multiplexers, appears as the best confi-
guration among those considered. Ability for both computers to 
access input data by sharing the multiplexers, gives advantages 
in rapid switching after failure. 
Multiprocessor configurations appear to give no special ad-
vantage over dual systems, for power plant use. The very high 
availability that they offer is not required on economic grounds, 
so there is no reason to invest in a large amount of software de-
velopment. However, if an acceptable configuration is available 
with good software and good intertask protection, there is no 
technical reason why it should not be used* 
Systems in which the DDC functions are separated from se-
quential control, recording, and display, are likely to show ad-
vantages from the point of view of software reliability. The 
responsibility for different parts of the control system can al-
so be divided in this way. The additional cost is between 5% and 
10i( of the system price, at present. 
- VI . 
Developments in computer system equipment will have a large 
effect in changing this pattern. Firstly, store costs are falling 
rapidly, and will continue to do so, perhaps by a factor of four 
over the next five years. This will reduce the cost by about 
$ ;0,000. (Further reductions in cost have little effect on costs 
of control, but make more extensive use of the computers attrac-
tive). 
Gecondly, introduction of solid state bulk memories such as 
'bubble memory* should make storage of programs and recording 
much more reliable. The effective cost reduction is not large. 
Thirdly, small computers should become available, with a 
fairly steady cost of about $ 6,000, with 8 K of store, within 
the next three years, and with steadily improving performance. 
The choice between these, and much cheaper desk top calculator 
types of computer, will need to be made at some stage within the 
next five years. It should be possible to use these computers in 
distributed systems, in order to reduce the effects of failure. 
At this stage, it should be possible to provide 'diverse1 re-
dundancy, such as separate manual control computers, rather than 
relying on duplication. 
Fourthly, the introduction of plasma, or liquid crystal dis-
plays, should reduce costs, increase display definition, and al-
low increased display sizes. The effect of cost reduction here 
could well be significant, reducing the cost of the system by 
some $ 50,000 over the next five years, or perhaps by a larger 
factor, if these devices become useful for television or teach-
ing purposes. 
The area where the largest improvement should be sought in 
a computer control system, is in plant data input and output and 
interconnection. With increasing use of LSI, the costs here should 
fall naturally, but not to as large an extent as store costs, for 
example, 
A major advance in software techniques should be forthcoming 
within the next two years, that is, a standardized process control 
version of FORTRAN, with standardized operating system calls. The 
effect of operating system standardization should extend far be-
yond FORTRAN programming alone. 
The cost of computer control in a power plant, with a high 
degree of redundancy, is seen to be comparable with analogue in-
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strumentation, provided that software problems and costs are not 
too great. The actual comparison depends on some detailed cost-
ing, and on the prospect for savings in cabling costs. 
If good process control software is not available, the cost 
comparison can be upset, both because of project time and soft-
ware costs. Two approaches to solution are to buy 'packaged* 
software or to produce the software 'in house'. Packaged soft-
ware for process control is available, but the choice of hard-
ware is then constrained, and the commercially available display 
software is limited. 'In house* development of software means 
that staff are available to cope with problems after commissioning. 
But this kind of development is only economic if a degree of 
continuity can be maintained, both in the production team and 
design, over several projects. 
Developments in computer hardware will be relevant over the 
next five years, and should lead to reduced system costs and in-
creased reliability. Distributed systems should result in fewer 
software reliability problems. 
Weak areas in the current pattern of commercial development 
are in display software design; in development of adequate pro-
cessor and sensor interfacing techniques; in the development of 
reliable software; and in reducing the costs of interface hard-
ware. 
If extensive use is to be made of computerized control sys-
tems, then it is very desirable that the image of the computer 
which is available to the operator should be improved. At the 
moment, it is manually difficult in the case of failure, to 
locate which unit has failed. Effective presentation of failure 
data to operators, coupled with effective techniques for 'switch-
ing off both hardware and software components, should greatly 
improve the ease with which a diversity of control methods can 
be used. 
